Over the past two years, increased attention has focused on Pakistan as a significant force behind the growth of Islamic radicalism and extremism in Kashmir. The US State Department's most recent report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, released in April 2001, specifically identifies Islamabad as the chief sponsor of militant groups fighting in the disputed Indo-Pakistani region. The same conclusion was reached in an earlier report by the National Commission on Terrorism and reflects current thinking in most US and Western policy-making and intelligence circles.

There are currently five main groups fighting in Kashmir , all of which benefit from Pakistani support:

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM);

Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LeT);

al Badr;

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM); and

Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM).

Islamabad's backing for these groups revolves around the perennial conflict with India – a militarily, economically and demographically superior state viewed as posing a fundamental threat to Pakistan 's long-term viability and integrity.

Sponsoring militancy in Kashmir is regarded as a relatively cheap and effective way of offsetting existing power symmetries (essentially through the philosophy of a 'war of a thousand cuts') while simultaneously creating a bulwark of instability along the country's vulnerable southern flank. Both are considered vital to ensuring that Pakistan has sufficient strategic depth to undertake a protracted conventional war on the sub-continent, should this ever become necessary.

Religious imperatives also come into play, particularly on the part of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, which enjoys a high degree of autonomy and executive space within Pakistan. The agency has specifically sought to replicate and transplant the success of the anti-Soviet Afghan campaign in Kashmir, exhorting foreign militants to participate in the conflict as part of the wider moral duty owed to the jihad. The medium to long-term aim, according to intelligence sources in New Delhi and Srinagar , is to trigger a generalised Islamic revolution across the northeast and eventually India as a whole.

Pakistani assistance to Kashmiri insurgents covers the ambit of training, logistical, financial and doctrinal support. At least 91 insurgent training camps have been identified in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), the bulk of which lie contiguous to the Indian districts of Kupwara, Baramulla, Poonch, Rajauri and Jammu . Basic courses run for between three and four months, focusing on weapons handling, demolitions and urban sabotage. Training for the more able recruits lasts somewhat longer and typically emphasises additional, specialised skills in areas such as heavy arms, reconnaissance and sniper assaults.

Responsibility for managing these courses falls to the ISI's Operations Branch and tends to be conducted through two sub-divisions: Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) and Joint Intelligence North (JIN). Islamist-oriented military officers are also believed to periodically 'moonlight' from their regular duties to supplement ISI instructors and help provide critical training in the fundamentals of guerrilla/jungle warfare and escape and evasion techniques.

Most of the camps are located near major military establishments (within 1-15 km), which Indian intelligence maintains provide the bulk of military-related resources, including light weapons (assault rifles, carbines, pistols, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades/boosters), ammunition, explosives, binoculars and night vision devices, communications equipment and uniforms.

Apart from military backing, Pakistan plays an important role in financing Kashmiri insurgents. According to India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), annual ISI expenditure to the main militant organisations runs to between US$125 and $250 million a year. These funds are used to cover salaries for fighters (which run from 5,000 to 10,000 rupees a month), support to next of kin, cash incentives for high-risk operations and retainers for guides, porters and informers.

In addition, the ISI helps to fund militant proxies through the circulation of counterfeit currency and by laundering profits derived from the heroin trade. The agency also handles foreign contributions and donations (most of which come from Saudi Arabia), funnelling these to Pakistani bank accounts that are opened under the auspices of insurgent political, religious or charitable fronts. Many of these payments are co-ordinated through Rahimyar Khan, a small town in the deserts of southern Punjab where every year thousands of wealthy Arabs come to hunt the region's wildlife.

Besides acting as a major source of military and financial assistance, Pakistan remains a pivotal centre of ideological indoctrination for the Kashmiri conflict, much of which is co-ordinated through the country's burgeoning network of theological madrasahs. Many of these schools equate the concept of the jihad – which most Islamic scholars interpret as 'striving for justice' – with guerrilla warfare and explicitly exhort their students to fulfil their 'spiritual obligations' by fighting in the name of the pan-Islamic cause.